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In 2008, the United States joined four other nations with Arctic coasts1 in issuing the
Ilulissat Declaration, which proclaimed that:
[T]he law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations. . . . We
remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement
of any possible overlapping claims. . . . This framework provides a solid
foundation for responsible management by the five coastal States and
other users of this Ocean through national implementation and application
of relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop a new
comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.2
By invoking the “law of the sea,” the five Arctic nations were actually referring to
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea3 (UNCLOS).4 Russia, Canada,
Denmark, and Norway have ratified the Convention. Although the United States has
not ratified, it considers UNCLOS to generally reflect customary international law.5
The United States’ willingness to support UNCLOS as the governing legal framework
in the Arctic is no surprise. Although the Ilulissat Declaration was signed during the
Bush Administration, the Obama Administration’s National Strategy for the Arctic
Region proclaims that:
Accession to the Convention would protect U.S. rights, freedoms, and uses
of the sea and airspace throughout the Arctic region, and strengthen our
arguments for freedom of navigation and over flight through the Northwest
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Passage and the Northern Sea Route. The United States is the only Arctic
state that is not party to the Convention. Only by joining the Convention can
we maximize legal certainty and best secure international recognition of our
sovereign rights with respect to the U.S. extended continental shelf in the
Arctic and elsewhere, which may hold vast oil, gas, and other resources.6
While chairing hearings in May 2012 as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, current Secretary of State John Kerry lamented that:
While we will sit on the sidelines, Russia and other countries are carving
up the Arctic and laying claims to the oil and gas riches in that region.
We, on the other hand, can’t even access the treaty body that provides
international legitimacy for these types of Arctic claims. Instead of taking
every possible step to ensure our stake in this resource-rich area, we are
watching others assert their claims and doing nothing about it because
we have no legal recourse.7
U.S. industry representatives have echoed this view as well. Jack Gerard, Chief
Executive Officer of the American Petroleum Institute, has noted that:
Establishing the continental margin beyond 200 miles is particularly
important in the Arctic, where there are already a number of countries vying
to expand their offshore jurisdictional claims. . . . The Convention will increase
certainty in a significant manner and will in turn make it much easier to decide
to invest billions of dollars in future operations.8
Despite this support, UNCLOS has endured a tortured journey within the United
States. President Ronald Reagan recognized the treaty’s national security value and
directed the United States to operate in accord with UNCLOS, with the exception of
the deep seabed mining provisions.9 President Reagan’s objections to the deep seabed
mining provisions were later resolved, leading President Bill Clinton to transmit
the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent on October 7, 1994.10 And yet, the
United States remains outside the convention. Although the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has twice voted UNCLOS favorably out of committee by wide margins, the
convention has never received a full Senate vote.11
The discontinuity between the national desire for an effective Arctic policy and the
interminable and fractious UNCLOS debate raises a fundamental question: Does
the United States’ failure to join UNCLOS actually hurt U.S. interests in the Arctic? Is
UNCLOS an essential foundation for U.S. Arctic policy or an unnecessary morass likely
to erode U.S. sovereignty and drain vitality from U.S. investments? Moreover, given
that the Arctic Council has adopted UNCLOS as its governing legal framework and that
the United States is still able to participate fully in Arctic governance, would UNCLOS
accession provide the United States any benefit not already available? If the United
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States can do everything of importance in the Arctic without joining UNCLOS, why go
to the trouble?
This paper addresses these questions. The paper begins by briefly surveying the
extent to which the convention’s provisions intersect with United States interests
in the Arctic. Not surprisingly, there is extensive overlap. The paper then reviews
arguments that UNCLOS is irrelevant or even antithetical to achieving these important
U.S. interests. After critiquing the anti-UNCLOS arguments, the paper examines the
case for UNCLOS. The paper focuses in particular on U.S. interests on the Arctic
seafloor, arguing that these interests are extensive and that accession would help
avert a wide range of potential political, legal, and regulatory challenges from foreign
governments and corporations. The possibility of such challenges creates political
and legal uncertainty as long as the United States remains outside the convention and
provides a bona fide disincentive for U.S.-licensed corporations to undertake the type
of exploration and development activities necessary to realize a host of offshore
benefits. Moreover, by staying outside UNCLOS, the United States is forfeiting an
opportunity to reinforce a favorable Arctic legal regime that could face pressure from
non-Arctic nations in the future. The paper concludes by recommending that the
U.S. accede to UNCLOS at the soonest opportunity.

The Intersection of U.S Arctic Interests and UNCLOS
UNCLOS establishes maritime zones with principles and rules relevant to the world’s
entire maritime domain, addressing topics ranging from suppression of piracy
to conservation of fish stocks to construction of artificial islands at sea. With its
seventeen parts, 320 articles, nine annexes, and a supplementary special agreement
on deep seabed mining, UNCLOS touches nearly every conceivable U.S. maritime
interest in the Arctic. Understanding this intersection is critical for evaluating the
convention’s potential as an instrument of U.S. Arctic policy.

Freedom of Navigation
As a nation with global maritime interests, the United States has consistently viewed
the UNCLOS provisions on freedom of navigation on the high seas and in exclusive
economic zones (EEZs), “transit passage” through straits used for international
navigation, and “innocent passage” through territorial seas as the convention’s
essential core.12 Although UNCLOS’ navigation provisions were not designed with the
Arctic in mind per se, the provisions are consistent with the United States’ interest
in freedom of navigation in and through the Arctic.13
Although experts differ on the imminence and extent of regular Arctic transits, some
scientific studies suggest that increasing temperatures will result in a seasonally
ice-free Arctic as early as the 2030s.14 As the ice recedes, many expect the opening
of more expeditious travel routes,15 with consequences for international security and
commercial activities.16 In particular, two trans-Arctic routes are expected to become
increasingly critical: the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route.17
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The Northern Sea Route refers to the routes running along the northern coasts of
Eurasia and Siberia between the Barents Sea and the Chukchi Sea.18 As of June 6, 2013,
the Northern Sea Route Commission approved fifty-four vessels to use the Northern
Sea Route during the 2013 summer.19 The number of vessels using the Northern Sea
Route since 2010 has increased tenfold.20 The Northwest Passage connects Baffin Bay
and Davis Strait in the Atlantic to the Beaufort Sea in the Arctic and includes all routes
along the northern coast of North America through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.21
Both routes connect the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans through the Bering Strait,22
and they have the potential to decrease the travel distance between Europe and
Asia by up to 5,200 nautical miles.23 Although the presence of seasonal ice limits the
regular use of these navigational routes, both Arctic- and non-Arctic-states seek to
use these waters more frequently.24
The lucrative navigation potential of these routes must be balanced against
environmental protection. Canada claims the waters that comprise the Northwest
Passage as its internal waters.25 Russia claims the waters of several straits along the
Northern Sea Route as internal waters and applies Article 234, pertaining to icecovered areas of the EEZ, to the rest of the route.26 The United States, among other
nations, has consistently disagreed with these claims,27 arguing that these routes
should be governed by the legal regime of transit passage through straits used for
international navigation.28
Both Canada and the Russian Federation have enacted regulations that the United
States believes amount to unwarranted restrictions on the right of transit passage.
Canada, for example, imposed a mandatory ship reporting and vessel traffic service
system (NORDREG) that governs transit through the Northwest Passage.29 NORDREG
covers Canada’s EEZ and the several Northwest Passage routes in the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago.30 Canada specifically cites UNCLOS Article 234 to justify NORDREG,
asserting that the reporting requirements are to prevent and reduce marine pollution
from vessels in the delicate Arctic waters.31 Similarly, the Russian Federation has
historically limited transit passage in the Northern Sea Route,32 using UNCLOS
Article 234 to justify the limitations,33 and has recently implemented more extensive
unilateral regulations to ensure shipping safety and environmental protection.34 With
receding amounts of ice for significant portions of the year, whether the Northwest
Passage or the Northern Sea Route meets Article 234’s climatic requirements for icecovered areas is debatable.35
Under UNCLOS, coastal states seeking to prescribe sea-lanes and traffic separation
schemes in straits used for international navigation must receive approval by a
“competent international organization” prior to adoption.36 The International Maritime
Organization (IMO) fills this role. The United States is working with other Arctic
nations through the IMO to create a mandatory “Polar Code” that will cover all
matters relevant to ships operating in both Arctic waters and the waters surrounding
Antarctica.37 The IMO recently announced that the Polar Code will be operational as
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early as 2015 and will be implemented by 2016.38 The extent to which the Polar Code
reconciles Russian and Canadian interests in regulating the Northern Sea Route and
Northwest Passage with freedom of navigation interests will be critical.

Environmental Protection
No nation, including the United States, disputes the moral and economic imperative
to protect the Arctic’s pristine environment. The United States understands the
fragility of the region and the need to practice responsible stewardship while
pursuing its Arctic interests.39 UNCLOS plays a prominent but not exclusive role
in this regard.
UNCLOS creates an obligation to “protect and preserve the marine environment.”40
However, it avoids specific rules or standards in favor of creating zones of regulatory
competence and providing a framework of principles designed to encourage the
creation of more specific rules and standards through domestic regulation and
separate international agreements.
UNCLOS provides states with exclusive, sovereign jurisdiction to regulate the
environment within their territorial sea.41 States also have sovereign rights “for
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources . . . of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its
subsoil,”42 and “jurisdiction . . . with regard to . . . the protection and preservation
of the marine environment” in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).43 In exercising
rights and performing duties in the EEZ, coastal states must do so with “due
regard” for the rights and duties of other states,44 not the least of which is freedom
of navigation.
In addition to the IMO Polar Code discussed above, several international environmental
agreements and guidelines augment UNCLOS. The International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), a treaty implemented by the IMO
(Marpol is short for marine pollution and 73/78 stands for the years 1973 and 1978),
governs the regulation, reduction, and prevention of ship pollution caused by
operational or accidental activities.45 The Arctic Council ministers recently signed the
Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in
the Arctic that created a regional response plan to cooperatively address oil spills
in the Arctic.46 The Arctic Council has also created working groups, particularly the
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group (PAME), to research and
create reports about environmental concerns unique to the Arctic.47 PAME previously
issued a report that studied the potential effects increased shipping will have on
the Arctic, suggesting ways by which states could prevent environmental harm,48
and provided advisory guidelines for offshore oil and gas production in the Arctic.49
PAME’s 2013–2015 agenda includes determining the adequacy of international and
regional commitments concerning environmental protection and promoting their
implementation and compliance.50
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Fishing
UNCLOS serves as the international foundation for fisheries management, giving
coastal states sovereign rights over natural resources in their EEZs, a duty to
conserve and the right to utilize fish stocks, and a duty to cooperate with other
countries in the management of certain fish stocks.51 The 1995 United Nations Fish
Stocks Agreement,52 to which the United States is a party, provides a precautionary
approach to fisheries and encourages regional cooperation in management of fisheries
in the high seas.53 Although UNCLOS does not provide a detailed regime through
which state parties must manage fisheries, it provides a broad framework that
encourages multilateral approaches to sustainable development of fish stocks.54
Several factors, including ice cover, cold water temperatures, and low primary
production prevent the development of commercial fish stocks in the central Arctic
Ocean.55 The seas surrounding the Arctic Ocean, however, contain large, globally
important fish stocks, constituting more than 10 percent of global marine fish catches
by weight and equaling billions of dollars in economic value.56 Compared to most
major international commercial fisheries, Arctic fisheries are comparatively wellmanaged due to the extensive regime of fisheries regulations that affect the Arctic.57
Four international or multilateral agreements, eight regional agreements, and four
bilateral agreements each affect different areas of the Arctic, different types of
fish, and different Arctic nations.58 The Arctic Council’s biodiversity working group
released a report stating that the illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fisheries
were a problem several years ago, but with UNCLOS and “substantial improvement in
cooperation,” IUU fishing has decreased in the oceans surrounding the Arctic.59

Marine Scientific Research
As most of the Arctic Ocean has not been explored, one of the U.S. policy goals in
the Arctic is to increase understanding through scientific research.60 Currently, the
foremost scientific research interest for the United States is to obtain data regarding
the geologic composition of the continental margin. In addition, the United States is
pursuing research in climate variability, Arctic marine ecosystems, oil spill effects,
and unconventional energy and mineral resources.61 Marine Scientific Research (MSR)
in Russian arctic waters, where Russia has the longest Arctic coastline, is hampered
by Russian reluctance to permit U.S. researchers access to Russian waters.
The United States has long accepted the UNCLOS regime for marine scientific
research. UNCLOS gives coastal states exclusive control over scientific research
in the territorial sea.62 Coastal states also have extensive rights in the EEZ, including
the right to reject a request by a foreign nation or company for access to its EEZ
or continental shelf if the project is of direct significance for the exploration and
exploitation of natural resources63 or involves drilling into the continental shelf,
the use of explosives, or the introduction of harmful substances into the marine
environment.64 The convention provides all states the right to conduct marine scientific
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research in the high seas.65 A state’s ability to perform scientific research in the area
is subject to the provisions of Part XI, the deep seabed mining regime.66 Article 143
states that all member states can conduct marine scientific research in the area,
but they must provide the results of their research and analysis to the international
community through the International Seabed Authority.67

Seafloor Resources
The United States has significant potential interests on the Arctic seafloor. In
the Obama Administration’s May 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the
administration stated that energy security is a “core component of [U.S.] national
security strategy” and by responsibly developing the Arctic’s proved and potential
oil and gas resources, the United States will reduce reliance on foreign oil.68 UNCLOS
provides detailed rules and procedures regulating activity on the seafloor.

UNCLOS and the Continental Shelf
UNCLOS provides that nations enjoy sovereign rights to the water column as well as
the living and non-living resources of the ocean floor to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the coastal baseline.69 The sovereign right to explore and develop
resources in this area, known as the continental shelf, is also considered customary
international law.70 UNCLOS, however, introduced several important new elements that
govern a state’s ability to extend its exclusive sovereign rights to explore and develop
its continental shelf resources.
The term “continental shelf” as used in UNCLOS refers to the geologic continental
margin made up of the geologic shelf, the geologic slope, and the geologic rise.71
UNCLOS specifically defines the continental shelf as either “the natural prolongation
of land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin” or 200 miles from a
coastal state’s baseline, whichever is greater.72 When a coastal state’s continental
margin extends farther than the 200–nautical mile limit imposed by customary
international law, UNCLOS provides that a nation may exercise sovereign rights over
the seabed floor beyond 200 nautical miles73 in the area known as the “extended
continental shelf.”74 The treaty includes two formulas to determine the outer limits
of continental margins75 and two methods to set constraint lines past which coastal
states cannot claim sovereignty.76
UNCLOS also provides a process through which coastal states can reduce the
potential for dispute and uncertainty over their continental margins’ limits. This
is particularly important in the Arctic where the U.S. extended continental shelf
likely overlaps with that of both the Russian Federation and Canada. Under UNCLOS
Article 76, a coastal state may obtain international recognition for the outer limits of
its claim to an extended continental shelf by submitting a claim to the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).77 The CLCS consists of twenty-one
elected experts in geology, geophysics, or hydrography, and may only be nationals
of UNCLOS State parties.78 A coastal state must gather scientific and technical data
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that describes the characteristics of the seabed and subsoil and submit its claim to
the CLCS within ten years of becoming a party to UNCLOS.79 A seven-member CLCS
subcommittee then analyzes the data and prepares “recommendations” regarding
the outer limits of the continental shelf.80 The recommendations must be approved
by a two-thirds majority of CLCS members.81 If the coastal state agrees to the
approved recommendations, the limits are “final and binding” on the international
community.82
There have been sixty-six extended continental shelf submissions to the CLCS made
by fifty-four member states to date.83 This process takes several years to complete
and it is anticipated that the CLCS will not render decisions on some submissions
(for example, those submitted in 2010 or later) until as late as 2030.84
Pursuant to Article 77.3, the coastal state is entitled to explore and develop the
resources of its extended continental shelf, subject to the royalty provisions set
forth in Article 82. Article 82.1 mandates that a state make annual payments with
respect to its exploitation of non-living resources on its extended continental
shelf. Beginning in the sixth year of production, payments are made starting at
the rate of 1 percent of the total value of production at each site, increasing by
1 percent each year until the twelfth year when the payment plateaus at 7 percent
of production value for every year thereafter.85
Payments are submitted to the International Seabed Authority (ISA or “Authority”),86
the UNCLOS-created body that regulates the exploration for and exploitation of the
natural resources in the area.87 The ISA distributes the royalties based on the needs
and interests of UNCLOS member states, but has no other involvement in the
extended continental shelf development process.88
The potential implications of this extended continental shelf regime are profound.
With one of the largest coastlines in the world, the United States is expected to
have over 291,000 square miles of extended continental shelf.89 The U.S. continental
margin off the coast of Alaska alone may extend to a minimum of 600 miles from the
Alaskan baseline.90 Alaska’s extended continental shelf lies over the Arctic Alaska
province, one of the many oil- and gas-rich basins in the Arctic.91 It is estimated that
there may be almost 73 billion barrels of oil and oil-equivalent natural gas located in
the Arctic Alaska province, the second highest estimated production capability of all
Arctic provinces.92 The continental shelf within the 200-mile EEZ under the Beaufort
and Chukchi Seas alone may have over 23 billion barrels of oil and 104 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas.93 Not only would development of these resources promote energy
independence, a U.S. national security objective,94 it would also create almost 55,000
jobs per year nationwide and generate over $193 billion in federal, state, and local
revenue over a fifty-year period.95 Due to delays in Arctic oil and gas exploration
in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, both within the U.S. 200-mile EEZ, the earliest
estimated date of extraction is sometime after 2019.96
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Gaining exclusive sovereign rights over the full potential U.S. Arctic extended
continental shelf will prove difficult, however, due to the close proximity among the
United States, Russia, and Canada and the potential for overlapping claims to extended
continental shelves. The Russian Federation was the first UNCLOS party to submit
an extended continental shelf claim to the CLCS.97 The CLCS rejected Russia’s initial
2001 submission but permitted it to revise and resubmit its claim. Russia anticipates
submitting its revised claim for its extended shelf in the Arctic by the end of the
year.98 Denmark, Iceland, and Norway also submitted claims to the CLCS99 and Canada
must do so by December 2013.100 This will leave the United States as the only Arctic
nation that has not formally claimed the outer limits of an extended continental shelf.
Moreover, if Russia accepts the commission’s recommendations, Russia’s extended
continental shelf boundaries are final and binding (although it is not clear who is so
bound). If the United States accedes and eventually perfects a claim to the outer limit
of its extended shelf with the CLCS, there is a chance that its extended continental
shelf will overlap with Russia’s. UNCLOS allows for two (or more) legitimate outer limit
claims but leaves it to the parties to agree to terms that split the overlapping extended
continental shelf between them. The United States has provided observations on
submissions by two other states, but, as a non-party, it cannot submit a claim under
Article 76.101

UNCLOS and the Deep Seabed UNCLOS provides that the seabed floor beyond
the limits of a coastal state’s continental shelf or extended continental shelf is
beyond national jurisdiction and comprises, in UNCLOS parlance, the “Area.”102
The Area is governed by its own legal regime designed to balance the interests of
coastal states with commercial and scientific interests in the deep seabed beyond
national jurisdiction with those of the entire international community. The Area
has been set aside as the “common heritage of mankind.”103 UNCLOS Part XI and
the subsequent Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS104
(“Part XI Agreement”) outline a U.S.-friendly deep seabed mining regime that permits
member States to acquire legal title to non-living natural resources in the Area.
UNCLOS created the International Seabed Authority to implement the Part XI deep
seabed mining regime. The ISA has three principle organs: the secretariat, the
assembly, and the council.105 The secretariat is made up of the secretary general, who
is elected for four-year terms, and his small staff.106 The assembly, comprised of all
UNCLOS member states,107gives final approval to rules and regulations regarding the
deep seabed mining regime, decides how to distribute the royalties received from
extended continental shelf projects, and elects the council.108
The council is the most important body within the authority and serves as the
executive organ of the ISA.109 It is made up of thirty-six member states110 and is
responsible for inter alia, “exercis[ing] control over activities in the Area”111 and for
recommending to the assembly “rules, regulations, and procedures on the equitable
sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area
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and the payments and contributions made pursuant to Article 82.”112 The assembly
may not approve financial payments unless recommended by the Council.113 If the
assembly disagrees with the council’s recommendations, the issue will be returned
to the council for further deliberations.114 If the United States accedes to UNCLOS,
the United States would be the only state guaranteed a permanent seat on the
council.115 Moreover, given UNCLOS-mandated voting procedures that are based on
consensus,116 the United States would have the irrevocable ability to veto any ISA
plan to distribute funds or financial assistance in a manner inconsistent with U.S.
desires.117
Activities in the Area are permitted pursuant to a multi-step approval process
detailed in UNCLOS Article 153, Annex III, and the Part XI Agreement. Interested
parties may prospect118 without prior approval from the authority; however, they
must inform the authority of their actions.119 Prospecting confers no legal rights
over the resources.120 To explore and exploit the Area’s natural resources, state
parties or entities sponsored by state parties must submit a comprehensive
application to the authority121 along with a processing fee.122 The authority issues
decisions on applications in the order it receives them. First, the Legal and
Technical Commission (LTC) reviews applications and makes recommendations to
the council on the approval of work plans.123 If the LTC recommends approval of a
plan, the Council must approve it within sixty days unless the Council decides by
two-thirds majority to reject it.124 The council also can approve a plan that the LTC
otherwise rejects.125
The ISA recognizes environmental protection of the Area to be of paramount
importance as the prospect of deep seabed mining increases. UNCLOS requires
the ISA Council to adopt rules, regulations, and procedures to ensure protection
of the marine environment from the hazardous effects that may result from deep
seabed mining activities.126 Each application submitted to the authority must include
a detailed Environmental Impact Statement “that provides full documentation of all
environmental and social issues” and describes the effects mining in a particular area
will have on the marine environment.127 The council can disapprove of the exploitation
of areas where there is a risk of serious harm from mining activities even if the
mining activities have already begun.128
There are a variety of deep seabed resources over which the United States could
potentially exert control if it accedes to UNCLOS. The United States could have
access to the mineral-rich deposits of polymetallic sulfides found near hydrothermal
vents, including the Gakkel Ridge and other vents already found in the Arctic.129
Hydrothermal vents are hosts to a myriad of marine species that make development
environmentally hazardous; however, the potential to recover valuable minerals
such as gold, copper, manganese, and others make it an attractive risk.130 The ISA has
announced it will begin issuing licenses for nodule production from hydrothermal
vents as early as 2016.131
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Once all Arctic nations establish the outer limits of their extended continental shelves,
there will remain only a small portion of the Arctic that will qualify as the “common
heritage of mankind.” At this point in time it is unclear what resources, if any, would
remain for the common heritage of mankind in the Arctic. However, United States
accession to UNCLOS would significantly advance its ability to stake an internationally
recognized claim to these resources if any resources are discovered in the future.
In the meantime, U.S. corporations interested in mining the deep seabed have been
forced to establish subsidiaries in state parties, with an opportunity cost to the
U.S. Treasury.132

The Case against UNCLOS
As discussed in section 1, the United States has significant interests in the Arctic, all of
which UNCLOS purports to regulate, at least to some degree. The nearly coterminous
overlay of UNCLOS with U.S. Arctic interests leads to the fundamental policy question:
how would U.S. interests in the Arctic be affected if the United States accedes to
UNCLOS?

The Argument that UNCLOS Is Harmful
UNCLOS critics have long argued that any benefits the convention might provide
are more than offset by its negative effects. Although this overarching argument is
not focused on the Arctic per se, its supporting points have shown resiliency in the
broader UNCLOS debate and have important Arctic implications.
One of the most prominent arguments is that the convention’s royalty provisions133
have the potential to drain billions of dollars from the U.S. economy by “taxing”
potential U.S. corporate profits. As claimed by Senator James M. Inhofe:
For the first time in U.S. history, [UNCLOS] will create an international body
that can tax this country. . . . [Royalties] will go from the U.S. Treasury to an
international group located in Kingston, Jamaica. . . . There could be billions,
if not trillions, in resources in the Extended Continental Shelf (ECS). Using
a conservative estimate of $1 trillion, that would mean $70 billion lost from
the United States.134
Opponents argue that U.S. royalty payments will go to an inefficient and corrupt
“UN-style bureaucracy”135 and that the United States will lose control over the
money upon transfer to the ISA.136 As former Senator Jim DeMint asked, “how is it
in the interests of the United States to turn the royalties over to an unaccountable
international bureaucracy [when the royalties] will be distributed to countries
that may be our enemies, like Sudan.”137
These arguments have proven a successful rallying point for UNCLOS opponents and
a potential political millstone for senators who might otherwise be inclined to support
the convention. The arguments have retained force despite the fact that the United
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States itself originally conceived the royalty plan under the Nixon Administration,
with the full support of U.S. industry—support that has remained consistent across
nearly four decades. Royalties were proposed as a modest concession in return for
agreement on the U.S.-sponsored extended continental shelf regime.138 Indeed, most
of the oil and gas that may be recovered would be in the first six years and thus would
not ever be subject to royalty payments. The “UN-style bureaucracy” argument has
also endured despite the fact that opponents have presented no evidence that the ISA
is either inefficient, overstaffed, or corrupt at any time throughout the nearly 19 years
since its founding in 1994.
The argument that the ISA could transfer U.S. contributions to terrorists and other
anti-U.S. interests also has great emotional appeal. However, the assertion is not
based on fact139 and has been rebutted repeatedly.140 UNCLOS opponents have
suggested in direct contradiction of the convention’s express terms that the assembly
might somehow be able to circumvent the express provisions preserving U.S.
influence in the council. The argument is spurious but remains a pillar of opposition
strategy. Fortunately, to date the ISA has not yet taken up implementation of Article 82.
But only if the United States is a party can it ensure that payments would not go to
terrorists or other anti-U.S. interests.

The Argument that UNCLOS Is Unnecessary
In addition to arguing that UNCLOS membership would hurt the United States,
UNCLOS opponents argue that the convention is unnecessary in the first place. As
Alaskan Senator Lisa Murkowski has noted:
There are some who do not see the point in joining the rest of the world in
ratifying the treaty. They say the United States already enjoys the benefits . . .
even though we are not a member, and that by not becoming a party to
the treaty, we can pick and choose which sections we abide by, while not
subjecting our actions to international review. I respectfully disagree.141
Although Senator Murkowski and other UNCLOS proponents may disagree, the
argument that UNCLOS is unnecessary remains potent because it offers an easy
resolution for an overburdened political system. If, as opponents argue, the United
States can accomplish its objectives without joining UNCLOS, why invest premium
political capital and legislative time on a treaty that has failed to energize a
supportive electoral constituency?
In making the case that UNCLOS is unnecessary, opponents do not dispute that the
convention provides certain benefits. Rather, opponents argue that the benefits are
independently available through other means, such as customary international law,
separate bilateral or multilateral international agreements, or the exercise of U.S.
military power. Opponents consider the convention’s benefits gratuitous and not
worth the alleged burdens of UNCLOS membership.
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The ease by which the United States has been able to enjoy some UNCLOS benefits
around the world has, in fact, helped reinforce opposition arguments that accession
is unnecessary. While the United States’ thirty-year practice of operating consistent
with UNCLOS has contributed to a maritime environment advantageous to U.S. global
interests, the very stability of the regime also allows UNCLOS opponents to claim that
U.S. accession is unnecessary. As discussed below, UNCLOS opponents contend the
United States may, in effect, have its cake and eat it too.

Unnecessary for Interests in the Ocean The primary and most obvious example of
the argument above is made with respect to navigational freedoms. For decades, the
United States has been a leading advocate of strict adherence to UNCLOS’ navigation
provisions, having lobbied aggressively for their inclusion during the convention’s
negotiation. Through three decades, successive U.S. presidents have directed—with
the complete support of the U.S. armed forces—that the military operate in accord
with UNCLOS provisions. Likewise, other departments and agencies have pursued
pro-UNCLOS policies and complementary international agreements as well.
Indeed, the United States has also done more than comply with UNCLOS; it has
asserted that UNCLOS’ navigational provisions represent customary international law
binding on the entire international community regardless of any state’s failure to ratify
the convention.142 Although there are exceptions, most UNCLOS member states comply
with the navigation provisions or at least do not challenge U.S. vessels exercising
UNCLOS-based navigational rights.143
In the Arctic, UNCLOS’ navigation provisions provide a useful paradigm for free
navigation.144 Both Russia and Canada have taken positions the U.S. maintains are
inconsistent with UNCLOS’ freedom of navigation norms in their respective efforts to
maximize control over the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage.145 Although the
United States could reinforce UNCLOS’ beneficial provisions of transit and innocent
passage by joining the Convention, there is little evidence that U.S. accession would
change Russian or Canadian positions or result in a dramatic shift in third country
positions absent being induced to do so by an international tribunal. Likewise, to
the extent free navigation norms are actually respected in the Arctic, it is difficult to
imagine how the United States’ failure to join UNCLOS will prevent the United States
from enjoying these benefits, although how long that respect will continue is uncertain
if it comes under increasing pressures to change the law of the sea regime. The same
could be said of environmental protection, fishing, and marine scientific research
benefits.
UNCLOS supporters naturally resist such arguments as shortsighted.146 Supporters
note, among other arguments, that as a non-party, the United States has no
recourse to the dispute settlement procedures of Part XV to address issues in the
aforementioned areas. The fact remains, however, that during the thirty years
UNCLOS has been in force, the United States has, in many respects, successfully
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played the role of “free rider,” enjoying benefits codified in, and sometimes introduced
by, the convention. To UNCLOS opponents, this is as it should be: sovereign states
should be able to enjoy UNCLOS benefits at will unless and until member states
attempt to limit the benefits or modify the norms that favor U.S. interests today.
Should such efforts arise, opponents insist that the United States should respond by
using traditional means of state diplomatic, economic, or political power. However, the
United States as a non-party will not be in a position to prevent any changes that will
be contrary to U.S. interests in the benefits it now enjoys.

Unnecessary for Interests on the Ocean Floor UNCLOS opponents also argue that
convention membership is unnecessary for the United States to achieve its interests
on the seafloor. Opponents contend that the United States already has the domestic
and international legal authority necessary to proceed with offshore exploration and
exploitation as far from shore as desired, limited only by technology and profit
margin. UNCLOS opponents argue that the 1945 Truman Proclamation, the 1953 Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, and the
1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA) provide all necessary legal
authority.147 In light of these authorities, UNCLOS is said to be irrelevant.
Several scholars have demonstrated that the opponents’ argument for what is, in
effect, an open seafloor is, in the words of John Norton Moore and John Norton
Garrett, “false and a disservice to the Senate.”148 Moore, Garrett, and others have
convincingly refuted the argument that the United States currently has the legal
authority necessary for unlimited exploitation of the non-living natural resources of
the extended continental shelf and beyond. These scholars demonstrate that where
U.S. statutes and the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf refer to the “continental
shelf,” each is in fact referring to the U.S. “geologic shelf,” which extends no more
than approximately 50 miles off the U.S. coast.149 Thus, Ronald Reagan’s claim to a
continental shelf of 200 miles, which is identical to what UNCLOS permits, stands as
the most expansive claim in U.S. history.150
The only circumstance in which UNCLOS opponents recognize a limit on the United
States’ authority to exploit the seafloor is when a U.S. neighbor can also make a
legitimate claim to a potential extended continental shelf that overlaps with the
U.S. claim. In these cases, UNCLOS opponents suggest that the United States may
enter bilateral agreements with its neighbors to resolve the potential conflict, and
these agreements would be conclusive between the parties. Under this view, the
international community has no right in the matter.151
The obvious—and only—example of such a U.S. bilateral agreement to date is the
U.S-Mexican agreement for an extended continental shelf boundary in the Gulf of
Mexico’s Western Gap, a 6,600 square-mile area beyond the 200-mile limits of both
the United States and Mexico’s respective continental shelves.152 However, because
this “gap” outside the limits of each nation’s continental shelf encompassed the
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overlapping territory of each nation’s potential extended continental shelf, the two
neighbors successfully negotiated a compromise. Subsequent to the agreement, the
U.S. Department of the Interior, as of June 2012, had granted sixty-five licenses to nine
companies.153 Each of the licenses contains a proviso that the company will pay the
equivalent of an UNCLOS royalty.154 Further, the outer limits of Mexico’s extended
continental shelf in the Western Gap of the Gulf of Mexico has been blessed by the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and Mexico has accepted those
recommendations.155 The internationally recognized outer limit thus is the MexicoUnited States continental shelf boundary in the Western Gap.
The Western Gap agreement has clear implications for the Arctic, where the United
States shares a potential extended continental shelf with both Russia and Canada.
UNCLOS opponents suggest that questions regarding international legal title to the
U.S. potential extended continental shelf in the Arctic will be resolved conclusively
when the United States enters bilateral agreements with Russian and Canada
respectively.156 As simple and therefore attractive as this position may be, it begs
several questions.
Under what legal authority would the Arctic neighbors have the right to divide
and claim for themselves an area lying, at least in theory, beyond their respective
national jurisdictions? Even assuming a legitimate legal basis to claim their extended
continental shelves and delimit them bilaterally, what basis would the states have
for desiring to and concluding their agreements outside the UNCLOS framework,
including ignoring Article 82 royalty payments? Finally, even if Russia and Canada—
both UNCLOS member states—choose to comply with UNCLOS on their respective
sides of delimited shelves, might they object to the United States not doing so on
its side, and, if so, would they pursue their objections? And how might the outer
limits of the U.S. extended continental shelf in the Arctic be determined given the
geographic differences from the Western Gap situation where there were only two
geographically opposite states with no third state or area interests involved?
The simple answer is that only by acceding to the convention can the United States
obtain its full continental shelf rights in the Arctic.

The Case for UNCLOS: The Need for Legal Certainty
As demonstrated above, the argument that the United States has legal authority
to proceed outside UNCLOS with projects beyond the 200-mile continental shelf is
flawed. U.S. industry has consistently said as much, arguing that UNCLOS membership
is required to provide the “legal certainty” necessary for exploration and exploitation
of the resources of the full extended continental shelf and beyond.157
While its calls for “legal certainty” have been unequivocal and enthusiastic, industry
has been less specific in articulating what the risks might be of proceeding without
the desired certainty. Industry representatives may consider the risks obvious to
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anyone with a basic understanding of large-scale capital investment. They may also
believe that simple statements of support for UNCLOS should be sufficient to generate
desired political outcomes. Whatever the reason, the minimalist explanations
have allowed UNCLOS opponents to speculate that industry’s advocacy may, in
fact, have shallow roots.
UNCLOS opponent former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has suggested
that businesses constantly make cost-benefit analyses, and have simply decided,
at least for the time being, that the time is not right for offshore investment.158 In
the meantime, “they want as much certainty as they can get.”159 To secure this legal
certainty, Mr. Rumsfeld has offered an alternative to waiting for the United States to
accede to the treaty, suggesting that U.S. companies pursue “joint ventures” with
other UNCLOS member states to secure legal title to deep seabed mining.160 In fact, at
least one U.S. company has already pursued this route.161 Apart from the philosophical
inconsistency in encouraging U.S. corporations to participate in a legal regime the
United States rejects, there may be opportunity costs to encouraging U.S. companies
to obtain security of tenure to drill in the deep seabed through licenses backed by
other countries.162
Informally, opponents have gone further, suggesting that industry representatives may
be overstating the “certainty” argument out of ignorance, or even a desire to curry
political favor with powerful pro-UNCLOS policymakers and legislators.163 Given how
central the “legal certainty” argument has become to industry support for UNCLOS, a
more detailed analysis of the need for “legal certainty” is essential.
In making the case for UNCLOS, industry has consistently expressed the concern
that someone might challenge legal title to a particular site or extracted resource
not obtained through the UNCLOS process.164 UNCLOS opponents have countered by
predicting there will be little opposition if and when a corporation actually begins
production pursuant to a U.S. license outside UNCLOS.165 Much is made, for example,
of the fact that no party to date has challenged licenses granted on the U.S. side of the
U.S.-Mexican Western Gap. UNCLOS opponents imply that the absence of a challenge
suggests that the international community is sanguine with U.S. licensing outside the
UNCLOS process. However, the Western Gap example is isolated and inapplicable
as demonstrated above, and in any case, hardly seems a rigorous test, given that no
company has actually begun exploration in the Western Gap and all U.S. licensees
have agreed to pay an UNCLOS royalty.166
Because no industry is currently producing on a U.S.-licensed site, neither opponents
nor supporters can predict with certainty how interested third parties might react
when production begins and profits are taken. In the meantime, however, to suggest
that no actor besides the United States’ border-sharing neighbors will be concerned
seems naïve. Given that UNCLOS member states have voluntarily created a seafloor
regime in which rights and benefits are contingent on beneficiaries fulfilling significant
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obligations,167 member states, at a minimum, have an interest in preventing free-riding
on, and circumvention of, this system. Others may have similar interests as well.

Potential Challengers
Who might see fit to challenge the actions of a seafloor free rider like the United
States? To begin, UNCLOS member states have obvious interests in the integrity of
the continental shelf and seabed regimes in which they invest. Potentially interested
states fall into at least three categories. First are states that may have an interest in
conducting commercial activity of their own in an area claimed by the U.S. but not
ratified through the UNCLOS process. Second are states that might have no objection,
per se, to U.S. activity, but wish to ensure the United States pays its fair share under
UNCLOS for the privilege of conducting commercial activity. Third are states that
stand to benefit from the Article 82 “equitable sharing” payments and seek to ensure
such payments are maximized.
In addition to UNCLOS member states, corporations with commercial interests in the
seabed floor may have an interest in ensuring that actual and potential competitors do
not obtain an unfair competitive advantage by operating outside the UNCLOS system.
Although Article 82 royalties are assessed to states, it seems reasonable to assume
that corporations may be assessed extended continental shelf fees by their licensingstates. Likewise, if operating in the area, corporations required to abide by rules
and regulations established to govern the area would presumably demand that their
competitors be bound by the same rules.
Similarly, the ISA, created by UNCLOS to “organize and control activities in the
Area” and to distribute economic assistance and Article 82 royalty payments, would
have an interest in preserving the integrity of the system it was created to oversee.
Importantly, the ISA has been vested with international legal personality, which
includes the power to bring suit to enforce its interests.168
Finally, enterprising NGOs might take a keen interest in whether a state and its
licensees are profiting at the expense of developing and land-locked states protected
by UNCLOS, or, whether states and licensees are complying with ISA regulations
created to protect the marine environment in and around the common heritage
of mankind. The most obvious targets for NGO disapproval and legal or political
action would seem to be the states and corporations operating outside the economic
assistance and environmental protection regimes created by UNCLOS.

Potential Legal Actions
Any of the actors noted above could be expected to take a critical view of U.S.
attempts to avoid the UNCLOS seafloor regime. Obviously, international disapproval
of particular U.S. policies is not new; however, disapproval takes on magnified
importance if opponents are able to channel their grievances into meaningful
legal challenges. Given that the public international law of the sea governs how

The Opportunity Costs of Ignoring the Law of Sea Convention in the Arctic

17

Hoover Institution

•

Stanford University

states and international organizations relate to each other in the maritime domain,
the inquiry into potential legal rights and remedies logically begins with public
international law.169

International Law
Liability Public international law governs the relationships between states and,
on occasion, the relationships of states to international organizations. Nations
commonly assume obligations to each other through treaties; however, a state may
be bound by a norm of customary international law notwithstanding its failure to
enter a treaty. Customary international law is created in a variety of ways, including
by treaty provisions adopted and followed by sufficiently large numbers of states as
a matter of legal obligation. Customary international legal obligations also give rise
to an array of international remedies. Thus, the fact that the United States has not
ratified UNCLOS does not necessarily mean the United States is free—as a matter of
international law—to ignore particular UNCLOS legal norms or processes. If, in fact,
the United States is under an obligation to comply with an UNCLOS provision that
has also become customary international law, failure to comply could give rise to
international liability and subject the United States to international legal remedies.
There is a strong case to be made that the United States is obligated under
international law to comply with UNCLOS’ seafloor regime despite the fact that the
United States has never ratified the convention. The most fundamental and compelling
reason the United States is bound by UNCLOS’ regime for the extended continental
shelf is because, quite simply, the United States says it is bound.170 Moreover, even
though the United States has not ratified the convention, as a signatory to the revised
deep seabed mining provisions, the United States has incurred an international legal
obligation to not act contrary to the “object and purpose” of the treaty.171 In light of
the prominent role given the deep seabed mining regime in the convention and its
necessary and practically inseparable relationship to the extended continental shelf
regime, the United States is arguably not permitted to act in any way that would
undermine these central provisions.
Even if a future president were to disavow the U.S. signature of the deep seabed
agreement, the U.S. government’s current position, which reflects its long held view,
would be used as evidence that the provisions have gained the status of customary
international law binding on the United States The U.S. failure to contest this
proposition—indeed, the U.S. long agreement with the proposition—is reinforced
by the fact that 85 percent of nation states, including all but fourteen littoral nations,
have ratified UNCLOS.
Actual state practice also reinforces the legitimacy of the extended continental shelf
regime in international law and its status as customary international law. To date,
sixty-five nations have submitted claims to the CLCS, demonstrating widespread
acceptance of this critical UNCLOS process.172
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Thus, it may well be that the United States is estopped from acting contrary to the
convention as a result of the President’s Ocean Policy Statement and subsequent
vigorous compliance with it.

Forum and Remedy The fact that the United States could well be found liable
under international law for failing to comply with the extended continental shelf
regime does not end the inquiry. A state or international organization must obtain
two separate types of jurisdiction over an opposing party. First, there must be
jurisdiction to bring a claim in the first place; second, there must be jurisdiction
to enforce any resulting judgment, which is commonly obtained by asserting
control over assets of the defeated litigant.173 Jurisdiction to bring a claim does
not necessarily mean jurisdiction to enforce a judgment. Within international law,
there are two primary forums in which the ISA or an UNCLOS member state might
attempt to bring and enforce a legal action against the United States for acting
contrary to UNCLOS.
One option would be to bring an action before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). The ICJ has jurisdiction in contentious cases only on the basis of consent
of the parties—i.e., a state cannot be sued at the ICJ unless both parties agree or
the state being sued has already submitted to jurisdiction through a prior, binding,
international agreement.174 In all likelihood, neither circumstance would apply to
the United States in the UNCLOS context. Presumably, the United States would
not consent to a specific suit. In 1985, the United States withdrew a long-standing
declaration recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ after the ICJ asserted
jurisdiction in the landmark case of “Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua.”175 Although in intervening years the United States has agreed to
participate in certain ICJ litigation, the circumstances of those cases are sufficiently
distinct and make them unlikely precedents for UNCLOS litigation.176 Accordingly,
it is unlikely a state or international organization will be able to obtain jurisdiction
over the United States for a contentious case at the ICJ.177
The fact that a contentious UNCLOS suit before the ICJ is unlikely does not,
however, render the ICJ irrelevant. Even without consent by the United States,
the ICJ could issue an “advisory opinion.” The UN General Assembly or the UN
Security Council may seek an advisory opinion “on any legal question” from the
ICJ,178 including disputes between states in which one has not consented to ICJ
jurisdiction.179 In addition, the assembly can authorize any other organ of the UN or
any special agency to seek an advisory opinion “on legal questions arising within
the scope of their activities.”180 Although advisory opinions are not legally binding,
they may, depending on the surrounding context, carry political weight. Moreover,
such an opinion might also be employed as precedent in foreign domestic courts
and international trade forums, or prove harmful to a corporation’s international
reputation, each of which is discussed below.
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Another forum option could be the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), which was designed to resolve disputes between UNCLOS parties.181 As
the United States is not an UNCLOS member state, it would presumably attempt
to resist jurisdiction. However, given that ITLOS is empowered to decide its own
jurisdiction182 and it has been assertive about doing so,183 that the United States has
stated UNCLOS represents customary international law, and that the United States has
an obligation to not defeat the “object and purpose” of a treaty it has signed, it is at
least worth considering whether there might be a circumstance in which ITLOS might
find jurisdiction over the United States in a contentious case involving the extended
continental shelf or deep seabed. Even if the answer is no, it seems entirely plausible
that ITLOS’ Seabed Disputes Chamber could issue an advisory opinion on an issue
involving the U.S.,184 with effects similar to those outlined above for the ICJ.

Foreign Domestic Law A second potential means to compel compliance with UNCLOS
regimes would be for a foreign state, corporation, or even an NGO to bring an action
against the United States, or, perhaps more likely, a U.S.-licensed corporation in
a foreign domestic jurisdiction. The enforcing party would be required to bring
its action in a jurisdiction with domestic law incorporating UNCLOS obligations.
Enforcement of UNCLOS in a foreign domestic court would depend on the relationship
between treaties and the foreign nation’s domestic law.185 Nations fall into two
categories in how they implement treaties into their domestic law. Some states
convert treaties into domestic law automatically186 and in an UNCLOS member state
taking such an approach, UNCLOS would be enforceable in a foreign domestic court
without any further action required by the member state. In contrast, some nations
require implementing legislation before a treaty is enforceable as domestic law.187 In
such a nation, UNCLOS would either need to be made self-executing upon ratification,
or be implemented through separate legislation.188
In either case, if a state is willing to incorporate UNCLOS provisions into its domestic
law, it is foreseeable that the state might also insist that corporations conducting
business within the state comply with UNCLOS. For example, state A might establish
a rule that before corporation Z does business within A, Z must demonstrate that its
international business is conducted consistent with UNCLOS. Further, if Z is already
doing business within A and undertakes a new non-UNCLOS-compliant venture
elsewhere, A might subject Z to penalties. Alternatively, A might allow private causes
of action to be brought by third-party corporations or NGOs against Z as a way to
compel UNCLOS compliance. Chevron, Exxon, and Coca-Cola are some of the U.S.
corporations that have been forced to endure long and expensive litigation in a foreign
domestic court for charges ranging from environmental pollution to human rights
violations.189
Today, several countries have statutes mandating UNCLOS compliance. For example,
Australia has passed the Sea and Submerged Lands Act of 1973, which gives
domestic effect to the provisions of UNCLOS.190 This domestic legislation would

The Opportunity Costs of Ignoring the Law of Sea Convention in the Arctic

20

Hoover Institution

•

Stanford University

allow Australia to bring suit against the United States or a U.S.-licensed corporation
in its domestic courts.
In addition to obtaining jurisdiction to bring the claim, a plaintiff hoping to obtain
complete success must also obtain enforcement jurisdiction over the opposing party.
This is easily accomplished if the corporation is doing business or has assets within
the relevant jurisdiction; however, even if not, jurisdiction would not necessarily be
foreclosed under international extraterritoriality principles. Jurisdiction might exist
if the United States or a U.S.-licensed corporation was harming the vital economic
interests of the plaintiff, taking action deemed to have a harmful effect within the
foreign state’s territory, or potentially affecting the interests of the international
community as a whole.191
To prevail against the United States, the plaintiff would need to overcome the
presumption that the United States, as a sovereign state, is immune from civil
jurisdiction.192 Although the law varies among states, this might be accomplished by
relying on the commercial nature of exploration and development on the extended
continental shelf and deep seabed. Typically, to determine if something is commercial,
one must look to the nature of the conduct rather than to the purpose. The economic
development of new waters backed with modern technology and investment is
certainly commercial in nature.

International Reputation
The survey above suggests a variety of legal means through which the United States
or a U.S.-licensed corporation might be challenged for operations on the seafloor
outside the UNCLOS system. To date, such challenges are speculative; however, the
variety of potential challengers and forums should lay bare the notion that the only
thing corporations have to fear is fear itself.193
Corporate reluctance to proceed on the seafloor may also arise from the perception
that a more immediate non-legal risk looms larger. The most threatening prospect
for prospective seafloor operators today—other than a foreign navy or coast guard
vessel arriving to forcibly eject them from an offshore site—may be the potential
loss of reputation that would result from undertaking a “rogue” operation outside the
UNCLOS regime.194 Companies with global operations and markets rely on political
support from foreign governments, financial support from foreign investors, and
market support from foreign consumers. Companies may be loath to jeopardize
success abroad by taking action that might antagonize these pillars of a favorable
business climate.195

The Case for Political Stability
As this paper has attempted to demonstrate, UNCLOS supports a variety of
important U.S. interests in the Arctic. The U.S. decision to support UNCLOS as
the Arctic’s governing legal framework was, and remains, sound policy.

The Opportunity Costs of Ignoring the Law of Sea Convention in the Arctic

21

Hoover Institution

•

Stanford University

To be sure, the UNCLOS framework is not a panacea. Arctic Council members do not
always share the same interpretations of specific convention provisions. While this
introduces complexity, it should not overshadow the fact that agreement on a common
legal framework reduces a significant potential barrier to progress. Moreover, lest
anyone be overly focused on UNCLOS’ gaps or ambiguities, UNCLOS skeptics would
do well to realize the United States could do much worse.
The Arctic Council’s May 2013 decision to grant observer status to China, India, South
Korea, Singapore, and Italy underscores the obvious: important international actors
outside the Arctic are intensely concerned with the region’s future.196 Currently, the
new Arctic Council observer states have no votes and their formal participation in
Arctic governance is limited to non-voting roles in working groups.197 Going forward,
however, it seems reasonable to ask whether China will be content to continue with a
tangential role in Arctic decision-making. As one observer has noted:
The mantra that the Arctic and its natural resource wealth belong to no one
country or group of countries but constitute the common heritage of all
humankind is virtually de rigueur in recent Chinese public commentary on
Arctic affairs. There are also indications that China sees itself at the vanguard
of the rest of humanity and the international community in this regard.198
Although it is clear that the vast Arctic resources are attractive to China,199
predictions about China’s political intentions in the Arctic should be made cautiously.
Official government statements have been limited and writing originating from
the Chinese academic community is not always a reliable indicator of future state
behavior. With this caveat in mind, however, there is evidence that at least some
Chinese may be disenchanted with China’s near-term access to Arctic resources.
In 2010, a Chinese admiral claimed that since China has 20 percent of the world’s
population, it should have 20 percent of the Arctic’s resources.200 While this may not
reflect official Chinese policy, it may reflect a sense of moral entitlement to Arctic sea
routes and resources.201 As one Chinese scholar sees it:
Arctic littoral states . . . all want to dip their cups into the rich stew of oil and
natural gas in the Arctic Ocean. [China should play a role] in the formulation
of international law . . . and jurisdiction over resources and sea routes and do
its utmost in the Arctic to make its own voice heard and strengthen its right to
speak up. Only those who become owners of resources will be able to obtain
their rightful value.202
Other Chinese scholars have suggested that UNCLOS does not entirely safeguard
China’s perceived Arctic interests, noting correctly that if Arctic states exercise their
extended continental shelf rights under UNCLOS, China’s opportunity to partake of
the “common heritage” in the Arctic will be greatly diminished.203
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To be fair, it would be a mistake to ignore evidence that China currently seems to
support UNCLOS as the governing legal regime for the Arctic.204 This is logical,
given UNCLOS’ protection of navigational freedoms and China’s interest in the
potential for shorter sea routes through the Northern Sea Route and Northwest
Passage. Support for UNCLOS’ free navigation provisions, however, does not require
support for UNCLOS’ seafloor provisions. In fact, one can easily conceive China
bringing its influence to bear in support of an Arctic treaty and accompanying legal
regime “uniquely tailored” for the “special needs of the Arctic and the international
community.”
China, the European Union, or other member states could also attempt to amend
UNCLOS in ways that could change the favorable extended continental shelf
and deep seabed mining regimes, or give coastal states more control beyond
their territorial seas and potentially obstruct the freedoms to navigate and to
lay and maintain international cables. Without access to UNCLOS procedures,
the United States loses the force of its objections and risks being a bystander as
Member States effectively amend customary international law through UNCLOS
amendments.205
In the years to come, will China continue to support a legal regime in the Arctic
that excludes China from the vast majority of the Arctic’s seafloor resources? And if
China finds the UNCLOS seafloor regime constricting and employs its considerable
influence and financial strength to lobby for offshore investment or for a new
approach, will other states without Arctic coastlines follow suit? Calls for an Arctic
treaty are not new,206 and given China’s interests, such an effort would hardly be
surprising.207 If such a movement were to arise, it is difficult to argue that the United
States would be in a stronger position to resist change as an uncommitted outsider
rather than a full-fledged member state.

Summary
This paper has examined the question of whether the United States’ failure to
join UNCLOS helps or hurts U.S. interests in the Arctic. After reviewing the range of
U.S. interests and UNCLOS application thereto, as well as the objections of UNCLOS
opponents, there is little reason to conclude that joining UNCLOS could hurt U.S.
interests. Indeed, in many ways, UNCLOS accession would benefit the United States.
Going forward, the precise extent to which accession would help U.S. objectives
will depend in large measure on the importance policymakers attach to resources
on and below the seafloor more than 200 miles from Alaska’s coast. If the United
States wishes to maintain maximum flexibility to develop its potential resources in
this domain, the U.S. should accede to UNCLOS at the soonest earliest opportunity.
Failure to do so increases the likelihood that the “package deal” so favorable to U.S.
interests will not endure to the detriment of U.S. interests.
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Representatives of major U.S. corporations with potential interests on the
seafloor have rightly expressed concern about making necessary investments and
proceeding with seafloor projects as long as the United States remains outside
UNCLOS. As long as the United States remains outside UNCLOS, any U.S.-licensed
activity on the U.S. extended continental shelf will be legally suspect and vulnerable
to challenge. Given these risks, as well as concerns about international reputation,
important U.S. industries will likely remain unwilling to proceed. In the meantime,
UNCLOS member states continue to queue up to perfect their own outer limits of
the extended continental shelf before the CLCS. If the United States were to accede
to the convention today and submit a proposal to the CLCS tomorrow, the CLCS will
not likely consider the petition until at least 2030. This time frame will continue to
expand until the United States joins the queue, which it cannot do from outside the
convention.
The forfeiture of UNCLOS benefits, on the seafloor or elsewhere, is particularly
troubling given that the benefits are available at minimal cost. As discussed within,
opposition arguments suggesting otherwise suffer from important legal defects as
well as flawed policy assumptions. Given that many of these arguments have played
a prominent role in the current UNCLOS stalemate, Arctic policymakers must
consider whether there may be new, more effective ways to persuade undecided
senators to confront the specifics of opposition arguments.
Arctic policymakers must also overcome the inertia arising from the fact that
near-term prospects for industry action on the Arctic extended continental shelf
and beyond seem remote. Potential Arctic benefits, no matter how lucrative,
provide little political incentive for immediate action. Incentive is further reduced
by the ease with which the United States has been able to enjoy many UNCLOS
benefits without joining the convention. While this has contributed to a more
stable maritime legal regime conducive to U.S. global interests, it has also led
UNCLOS opponents to claim successfully—albeit unwisely, and, in some instances
incorrectly—that the United States can continue to exploit all UNCLOS benefits
without paying the minimal costs of UNCLOS membership. Application of this
fallacy to the Arctic could be costly.
The United States should join UNCLOS to fully preserve U.S. Arctic interests.
Although some of the convention’s most important advantages in the Arctic may
not be immediately available, UNCLOS would allow the United States to preserve
maximum flexibility today for developing offshore energy resources tomorrow. In
addition, accession would reinforce a legal regime favorable to other important
U.S. Arctic interests as well, and deter prospects for the UNCLOS to collapse or be
revised to the detriment of U.S. interests.
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206 See, e.g., Barry Hart Dubner, On the Basis for Creation of a New Method of Defining International,
Jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, 13 Mo. Envt’l. L & Pol’y Rev. 1, 17 (2005); Angelle C. Smith, Frozen
Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War, 41 Geo. Wash.
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